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Introduction
Peacebuilding without the keywords 'local' or 'national' combined with 'ownership' has almost become unthinkable nowadays, a situation exemplified by the discursive use of these concepts in United Nations peacebuilding since the 2000s.
i For policy-makers, 'local ownership' is more often than not used as a generic term, without further explanation or specific definition, implying that everyone knows what is meant by it.
ii Actually, far from being consensual, the concept of local ownership is at the very centre of current academic debates on peacebuilding.
For one group of scholars, local ownership is considered as a necessary institutional response to recent difficulties experienced by peacebuilding missions, exemplified by faltering legitimacy of dominant peacebuilding institutions, provided that peacebuilders get the balance right between not enough and too much involvement.
iii But critical voices have problematised this observation, arguing that ownership has often come to remain superficial to only disguise the fact that power still remains in the hands of dominant and wealthy institutions, both national and international, while local agency is manipulated and instrumentalised for the purposes of the former. iv In that sense, contemporary discussions of local ownership often end up either endorsing the concept or alternatively altogether critiquing it. To paraphrase Latour on a very different conversation (the social scientists' discourse on objects), the debate becomes divided between two irreconcilable positions, considering the phenomenon as either 'too weak or too strong.' v However, these monolithic accounts are not satisfactory. We aim to contribute to this literature, and possibly nuance the claims, by highlighting the multi-faceted nature of ownership, and by breaking down the 'social' element of local ownership in different components, which, as we claim, are both normative and material in nature.
4
Looking at the material and normative dimensions of peacebuilding enables us to highlight specific, contemporary, trends in the field of international peacebuilding, which may have been obscured in current debates. The starting point here is the liberal peacebuilding debates, vi where the liberal peace refers to the idea that certain kinds of society will tend to be more peaceful, both in their domestic affairs and in their international relations, than 'illiberal'
states. Liberal peace encompasses socio-cultural norms associated with peacemaking, as well as the international and national structures instrumental in promoting it. Economic considerations are also central in the model, for liberal peacebuilding implies 'the globalisation of a particular model of domestic governance-liberal market democracy-from the core to the periphery of the international system.' vii The failure of many liberal peacebuilding attempts to produce a sustainable peace is often not a result of a lack of material ownership, which we see as having been successful in creating material connections between interveners and local elite. Instead, one could argue that despite strong attachments to the material aspects of peacebuilding, many societies have not developed strong attachments to the normative dimensions of international interventions and have thus been reluctant to take ownership of a version of peace that seems distant from the realities of everyday life at local level. This is perceived as being distant from "everyday social realities", which, in many post-conflict societies, include customary processes and institutions, indigenous forms of knowledge, traditional authorities, elders, chiefs, communities, tribes, and religious groups. viii In that respect, discussing material and normative dimensions of peacebuilding enables us to look at different possible scenarios, including cases where social-material dimensions are strong but have created feeble social-normative attachment to peace or cases where deep social-normative attachment to peace is noticeable despite -or in spite of -superficial social-material ownership.
5
The lack of engagement with the different dimensions of the local ownership of peacebuilding has not only been obvious in peacebuilding practices, but also in the ways in which academic discourses have framed the concept of ownership. Such discourses have tended to assume a natural and almost de-politicised connection between material and normative attachment to peace. We will challenge the tendency to take for granted the link between socialmaterial and social-normative attachments to peace and instead assume that the different intensities and logics of attachment to peace condition the relationship between societies and interveners. In that respect, the sustainability of peacebuilding must be viewed in its constituent components, both material and normative.
Our observations are based on our long-term engagement with a variety of post-conflict contexts, but in this case will draw specifically from data collected during fieldwork in BosniaHerzegovina ix between 2008 and 2011. It struck us that there is disillusionment among international and local actors, in Bosnia and elsewhere, about how the abstract idea of local ownership can be implemented efficiently and meaningfully. It is interesting to observe that the academic literature seems to be in line with this trend, torn between the need to enhance the structure of local ownership and the utmost disillusionment with it. It is out of such observations that this article addresses the complex nature of local ownership, proposing a move away from a unified view on ownership as present or absent, and rather moving towards a multi-faceted concept which addresses the different types of social attachments to peace. We will therefore first look at the notion of 'attachment', mainly, but not exclusively, drawing on Latour's conceptualisation of attachment to use this as the basis for the development of a theoretical model of different scenarios of peacebuilding attachment, before illustrating this with the example of Bosnia. One general caveat needs to be introduced here. While we have found 6 Latour's discussion on attachment particularly fecund for our object of study, we have to specify that we consider ourselves to a certain extent sociologists of the social, x and hence we have to distance ourselves to a certain extent from Latour's ontology of the collective. We do agree with
Latour and the Latourians that the 'social' has to be more than an 'established domain of reality'
to include 'what is connected or associated,' xi but we won't engage with networks between human and non-human actors in this current piece. Nevertheless, we hope that the exploration of the social-material dimension of ownership -however partial and limited it will be -will open future perspectives for research on non-human actants xii and their connections to the networks of peace.
Attachment
The concept of attachment has its roots in a body of literature prominent in psychology and mainly goes back to the work of John Bowlby. xiii In his studies leading to the development of the concept of 'attachment', Bowlby concluded that attachment was a bond to other people, developed in the early childhood stages of a person, framing their connectedness to other people in their environment. However, while being further developed in the discipline, the concept of 'attachment' transcended the field of psychology and came to be used in different fields. In the business literature, it is often cited in relation to commitment to work and as a trigger of motivation of workers. xiv We can therefore see a close connection between attachment and agency in this literature, given that the former seems to facilitate the latter. Where there is attachment, there is motivation and commitment to act. Agency traditionally reflects the human capacity to act, a capacity that manifests itself in a social world in which structures impact upon the opportunities and resources available in a constant interplay of practices and discourses. regional, international and so forth) frames and channels agency through the diverse modalities of attachment to those.
At the same time, this also means that we can never be 'unattached', although we can substitute one attachment for another. xxii Attachment can thus be said to become a manifestation of agency in that people are most closely connected to the attachments which make most sense to respond to the challenges of their everyday lives. We may therefore ask: Which elements of social and political life do people become attached to and want to own, which ones do they feel are unnecessary or even a nuisance to them? Against the background that we view attachment as a manifestation of agency, we claim that attachment is a connection resulting from the challenges of everyday life, rather than simply oppression or force. It points to the agency of people to link with policies, actors and norms they want to build strong bonds with, and which ones they feel should be kept at a safe distance, without implying a structural over-determination of attachments. This rather means that 'the social' becomes visible through ever-changing attachments to the peace being created in the complex politics of the peacebuilding landscape.
Here, rather than suggesting a particular ontology of peace, we are interested in the ways in which local actors feel connected to the goals that peacebuilding agencies are working towards, in all their complexity. Do local actors approve of the general direction in which the peacebuilding project is going? How and to what extent do they associate with the project at stake? Latour indeed suggests that we can only perceive the social 'when new associations are being made.' xxiii Thus the continuously transforming peacebuilding landscape with its shifting discourses around who owns the politics of peace can be seen as a landscape of agency in which new attachments are constantly (re-)created while others are being weakened and replaced in the light of their role in wider social networks.
The Rise of the Local Ownership Agenda
Before engaging with the question as to why certain contexts have produced stronger attachment to peace than others, we first need to introduce the recent development on local ownership in contemporary peacebuilding, as well as what we consider our contribution to these debates. This literature is based on a simple observation: after a decade of evolution toward more 'integrated,' 'multi-faceted,' or simply stated more intrusive peace operations, with the high point being the United Nations administrations of Kosovo and Timor-Leste at the beginning of this century, the peacebuilding literature has started to take heed of the 'unintended consequences' agenda xxiv to integrate in its analysis all facets of interventions and not only those accounted for traditionally by peacebuilding actors themselves. Debates around sovereignty and rules of engagement, which were so central in the first half of the 1990s, xxv gave way to discussions on authority and international administrations at the end of the 1990s. and 2011, the lack of ownership was emphasised as one of the most pressing challenges of postconflict Bosnia. This problem was mainly ascribed to the nature of cooperation with local authorities, which were often viewed as complex or even problematic. xli At the same time, the 13 local population seems to be more divided about the need to strengthen ownership, or alternatively, whether to ask for even stronger degrees of intervention.
xlii Interestingly enough, however, neither local nor international narratives tend to define the concrete meaning of ownership in the case of Bosnia, and a linkage between material and normative ownership is taken for granted. Instead, from an institutional perspective, local ownership is viewed as a political process, which is expected to spill over into diverse elements of society, both socio-political and economic. The EU understands ownership as the 'attempt to make people responsible for their own decisions, ideally through passing on knowledge to people from the EU, that is, from EU practice to local partners.' xliii However, segments of the local civil society resent being perceived as 'a subcontractor for the EU' implementing its policies such as democratisation and reconciliation and in the process serving as a legitimating device for the EU to claim local legitimacy and ownership rather than imposition. This dimension includes the current normative agenda promoting 'good governance,'
Opening Up the Local
'reconciliation' or 'human security' among other normative end-goals of international interventions. In a sense, the attachment to the social-material dimension of peacebuilding can be read as the willingness on the part of local actors to engage with international incentive structures and accept the social-material connections that bind international and local actors together, while attachment to the social-normative dimension reflects a degree of preparedness to own its normative underpinnings and contents, embracing the international peacebuilding normative agenda in terms of language and meanings.
Different peacebuilding scenarios
In effect, most of the literature on ownership focuses on normative aspects while marginalising material implications. By including social-material and social-normative dimensions of ownership, we suggest four ideal-typical situations.
A shallow and superficial social-normative ownership (situation 1 in Table I below) encompasses logics of co-optation and discursive politics, aptly exposed by the critical literature.
Social linkages between international and local structures are weak and tenuous, producing a situation that can easily be manipulated in turn by local political entrepreneurs to bolster a resistance agenda. lix In contrast, deep social-normative ownership (situation 2 in Table I) On the social-material axis, superficial social-material ownership (situation 3 in Table I) describes situations marked by either feeble linkages between international and local structures exemplified by the instrumentalisation of funding sources by local actors (sometimes out of necessity) and by international actors (to legitimise a certain set of policies), or situations where material interactions between donors and recipients are simply not a driving force behind the peacebuilding process. It can be conceptualised from a critical perspective as a low-degree of interpenetration of the 'two worlds' lx marked by risk mitigation strategies and the proliferation of gated-communities, lxi or alternatively as processes that mirror the elusive grassroots, bottom-up, processes that are not relying, in theory, on external funding and external support to operate.
Deep social-material ownership (situation 4 in Table I ) encompasses hybrid processes where there is socialisation of locals into donor structures as well as donors' socialisation into specific local practices. Hence, the socialisation process in the material sphere is co-constituted by the liberal peacebuilding vision of what constitutes acceptable 'civil society' on the one hand (and which project and/or organisation should be funded), and local actors serving as 'gatekeepers' of their own communities on the other (through a process of understanding the 'rules of the game' to meet donors requirements). This process can be led by and lead to a 'mushrooming' of NGOs as donor instruments, lxii thriving in the ideal environment constituted by aid flows. At the same time, this situation can include a plurality of processes depending on the approach one takes to understand, ranging from the communalisation of interests -postulated by the problem-solving literature as the result of a successful locally-owned process -to outright dependency creation.
Even if situations involving extensive aid flows will tend to be represented as a 'deep socialmaterial' situation if only by the sheer amount of specific interactions between local and international actors in donor structures that aid processes entail, the social-material axis is not a proxy for a quantitative analysis of material aid flows but is rather specifically tied to the socialisation process linked to material structures.
If we return to the literature on local ownership, critical scholars correctly point to the superficial social-normative nature of many ownership practices by underlining the co-optation at work and the lip service paid to local ownership (situation 1 in Table I ). Based on this observation, they tend to postulate an essentially shallow or discursive form of social-material attachment, centred on the instrumentalisation of funding sources and legitimisation discourses (situation 3 in Table I ; see also table II below). Starting from the opposite side of the equation, problem-solvers apprehend the ownership debate from a social-material ownership perspective, looking at the process of socialisation into donor structures and rules that is an integral part of liberal peacebuilding (situation 4 in Table I ). From that premise, they postulate that local ownership of the material aspects of peacebuilding necessarily contributes to a stronger, deeper, and more meaningful process of norms diffusion into wider society, leading to a deeper form of international-local attachment (situation 2 in Table I; see also Table II ). Both accounts starts from a valid starting point and are, to a certain extent, compatible; not unlike the elephant and blind men metaphor, lxiii the local ownership debate depends on which part of the intervention architecture one stresses. Three caveats need to be introduced. First, our argument does not imply a necessary outcome or route between the different situations described above. On the one hand, we outline connections between categories which are likely in the current binarisation of thinking of local ownership, that is, an assumed link between situation 4) and 2) by the problem-solving approach 20 (situation number IV in Table III below), or the link between situation 3) and 1) for the critical scholarship (situation number I in Table III ). We also suggest that, in the cases we are familiar with, this binarisation has to be broken up to account for the transformation of deep socialmaterial ownership into superficial social-normative ownership (situation number III in Table   III ). However, while we postulate that this process is the most likely one in the context of heavyfootprint liberal peacebuilding interventions, this is not to suggest that this route or connection is automatic. depending on how the networks of actors involved in the peace-and state-building process construct their attachment to the peace being created.
Third, whereas the aggregate collective actions of external donors tend to lead to a peacebuilding process that can be described as either superficial or deep on the social-normative and social-material axes -leading to broad assessments such as 'liberal peacebuilders have failed create a sustainable peace in Iraq, Kosovo or Timor-Leste' -individual actors or programmes have logics of their own, creating their own attachment to peace. Certain dynamics on the ground can lead to a strong attachment to peace (whether social-normative or social-material) despite a general failure by international actors to connect the peace agenda to the everyday needs of the local population. The reverse can also be true. With this in mind, we suggest to disaggregate the different connections to peace in Bosnia, looking at each scenario in turn and with the hope of providing a more textured approach to the various possible attachments to peacebuilding.
Exploring ownership connections in peacebuilding in BiH

Situation (I): Superficial social-material and superficial social-normative attachment to peacebuilding
Not only in BiH, but also elsewhere, has the lack of attachment to liberal peacebuilding often been ascribed to the prevailing and ongoing dominance of ethnic identities. Ironically, in BiH this lack of attachment is not just a coincidence or result of ancient hatreds, but has instead been institutionalised by the Dayton Peace Agreement, which, despite its symbolic role as safeguard of the liberal peace in BiH, has institutionalised ethnic divisions through the ethnicisation of politics. lxv Sven Simonsen suggests that voters primarily kept voting for ethnic political parties, lxvi even ten years after the end of violent conflict. This seems at odds with the EU's 22 efforts to de-ethnicise the country's divided police force and political landscape, despite
Dayton's consociational arrangements. Indeed, the EU's efforts to create a joined police force remained without much success and were unable to fully reform the Bosnian police into one unified force. Berg suggests that this is not least a result of the fact that the underlying political landscape remains ethnically divided and thus the Bosnian police force not amenable to profound reform. lxvii In that respect we can argue that the persistence of ethnically-orientated policies in At the same time, this is not to demonise a lack of attachment to peacebuilding as a necessarily nationalistic or ethnic practice, although resistance can take these forms. The lack of attachment to peacebuilding can also be a conscious choice for actors who feel the framework does not promote peace in an adequate way, but who still resist ethnic or nationalist sentiments. For instance, when taking a look at the role of artists and cultural actors in Bosnia, the decision of many artists to keep their attachment to peacebuilding at a low profile reflects a disagreement about what peacebuilding should look like. lxx The fact that, very generally speaking, artists in BiH seem to have a superficial socio-material attachment to liberal peacebuilding can be said to be due to two aspects. On the one hand, there is a general mistrust of artists as far as 23 internationally-sponsored projects are concerned. Ambrosia, an association of artists, for instance, have a stated goal of creating an alternative (social and arts) scene, not through (internationally-sponsored) NGO mechanisms, but just by acting as "crazy artists." lxxi In that respect, conditional funding can represent an obstacle to the work they do. On the other hand, Western donors often feel uncomfortable funding artists. As one official stated, cultural organisations do not tend to get funding as they do not have the capacity to comply with the funding guidelines. lxxii Hence, cultural actors are not seen as capable of developing a socialmaterial attachment to the peacebuilding project.
In terms of the social-normative attachment to peacebuilding, we argue that, rather than signifying that artists are not attached to peace, the disconnect between artists and international peacebuilders reflects a lack of attachment to international peacebuilding. In that sense, many artists feel attached to the complex and competing visions of peace to the development of which they contribute, whilst staying fairly disconnected from international (usually EU-driven) peacebuilding.
A similar point in case is the public protests that took place all over the country in 2014. The citizens' movement that led to the protest was internally grown and not inspired through any international project funds. Citizens went onto the streets to protest against corruption, nepotism and for social justice. The movement then went on to create lasting structures, the so-called 'plenums'. These citizen-based discussion fora were efficient in the sense that they created inclusive structures of citizen participation in politics, forced politicians to resign and to ask for more accountability. In that sense, one could think that this would be the ideal-type situation in At the same time, the amount of international funding committed to peacebuilding-throughfootball has been limited. Although there have been a few internationally-funded NGO projects specifically dedicated to using football as a means of facilitating peace, lxxix football has mainly been funded through local businesses, politicians and state / government funds. lxxx Peacebuilding in this sphere has thus not been very costly for international peacebuilders, but has connected to its framework of cross-ethnic collaboration and institutionalisation.
This is somewhat similar to the work that numerous youth centres all over BiH are doing. Often without access to funding, they represent shared spaces in many divided or war-torn towns.
Carabelli, for instance, casts light on the youth centre OKC Abrasevic, located on the former front line in Mostar, citing the centre's website:
The Youth Cultural Centre ABRAŠEVIĆ believes that a different Mostar is possible and wants to build an open society based on civic ethics. In fact Abrašević is seeking for and applying alternative formulae in the fields of culture, economy and politics as an answer to negative trends present in BiH society.
lxxxi Carabelli suggests that the centre symbolises and stands for the values of justice and solidarity as well as reducing polarisation and creating 'spaces of difference.' lxxxii A public lecture in the centre indeed suggests that it aims to be a 'space of trust' to the local youth in a divided city.
lxxxiii Similarly to what the 2014 protests had aimed to achieve, these values can be said to be fundamentally liberal ideas, that is, ideas that liberal peacebuilders would be expected to endorse as well. It is therefore striking that the youth centres are finding it hard to, or are sometimes not willing to, access international funds. The youth centre Alter Art in Travnik, for instance, was 27 originally set up as an NGO, but the founder then changed his mind as he realised that he did not want to become an administrator, but instead spent his energy on providing a space in which people could express themselves freely. lxxxiv This example reflects the extent to which attachment to the material underpinnings of peacebuilding can put actors at risk of losing energy they could instead spend on peace work itself. This is certainly not always the case -indeed, the youth centre in Srebrenica did receive EU monies for their work on activism and reconciliation.
lxxxv What it reflects, however, is a potentially arising friction between the need to engage with the socio-material conditions of peacebuilding on the one hand, and an attachment to its socionormative components on the other. The paradox lies in the fact that, at its origin, the reconciliation literature and approach presupposes predominantly an attachment to the ideational, perhaps even spiritual, components of peacebuilding. lxxxvi However, this becomes increasingly difficult to achieve in the absence of funds, so actors who focus on the socio-normative dimension of peacebuilding will often find it harder to implement their projects.
Situation (III): Deep social-material and superficial social-normative attachment to peacebuilding
This situation is, as we claim, the most common constellation in situations in which the transfer of international authority to local ownership has failed to produce deep social results and has mainly focused on the social-material aspects of the cooperation. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, we can observe a strong connection between international institutions and local actors on a socialmaterial level, while those links hardly turn into long-term social-normative attachments to the peace that is being built. The aspect of international peacebuilding which seems to feed into local practice is therefore a socialisation into donor structures instead of joint agenda of hybrid it describes a phenomenon during the course of which social-material attachment to peacebuilding happens very quickly, while not necessarily (but possibly) being accompanied by a social-normative attachment to the overall peacebuilding project.
Situation (IV): Deep social-material and deep social-normative attachment to peacebuilding
In terms of the desired sustainability of peacebuilding, an attachment to it based on both its social-material and social-normative underpinnings is the ideal-type situation from the perspective of the international peacebuilders. We notice that in BiH, peacebuilding remains 29 fragile and somewhat disconnected from local structures due to the rare occurrence of this situation. Indeed, it is actually difficult to come up with case studies which illustrate this ideal type. One organisation that seems to come close to this scenario is Mozaik, an organisation based in Sarajevo and pursuing a variety of projects throughout the country. The NGO is well-funded by international grants and thus needs to concentrate a large part of its energy on the administrative aspects of its work. Staff emphasised their need to maintain a professionalised finance department as well as keeping good links to a variety of donors, including the World Bank, UNDP and the EU. xcii While this describes an attachment to the social-material component of peacebuilding, the organisation also suggests an attachment to its social-normative components. Indeed, trigger words such as 'social capital', 'social and economic development'
and 'building trust' are part and parcel of the organisation's approach. xciii It becomes obvious that there is a connection between those terms and those used by the larger international donors represented in BiH. From the perspective of the EU, a frequent funder of the organisation, this represents an ideal situation in that its funds have led to a social-normative attachment to the international peacebuilding mission over time.
Of course, what remains to be discussed here is the extent to which this strong attachment to peacebuilding results in the creation of sustainable peace or instead the perpetuation of (potentially illegitimate) structures of external dominance.
Conclusion
This article has attempted to explore the different configurations that attachment to international peacebuilding can take on the ground, and as such has attempted to go beyond the unsatisfactory representations offered by both the liberal peacebuilding scholarship and the critique of it. By breaking down the concept of local ownership into its social-normative and 30 social-material dimensions, and by linking this discussion to the attachment literature, this article has suggested a theoretical framework that opens up the analysis of peace processes beyond success and failure and explores the various scenarios, crystallised around four 'poles' or 'idealtypes'. The different scenarios have also been illustrated through the use of case studies from Bosnia-Herzegovina, looking at ways that attachments to peace have been translated into everyday coping mechanisms, which can range from rent seeking behaviour to reconciliation practices for instance. The different case studies -which are not meant to be in-depth case studies but rather illustrations of the different ideal-typical poles -reflect the extent to which peacebuilding has varied in terms of who owns it and in what ways -normatively or materially.
Therefore, the article suggests that discussions around the extent to which local ownership has been created (or not) have to be approached in a more nuanced way than what the existing literature has done. The link between social-material and social-normative ownership is therefore not natural as often assumed, but politicised and conditional on the nature of peace that is being promoted as well as the networks of actors that engage with it, or refuse to do so. It is not least due to this aspect that the success and failure of local ownership is deeply contested.
